Alfa Bank (Russia): Sink or swim - we don't give a f*ck. Part 2

 

"You're on your own! Good luck!" #AlfaBankFraud 

Originally published as “Альфа-банк: Спасение утопающих - дело рук самих утопающих? Часть 2-я” here. For Part 1, see here.

On 30 June 2020, I got a call on my mobile, whose number is linked to my Alfa Bank account. The caller addressed me by my first name and patronymic, having introduced himself as a member of Alfa Bank's Financial Monitoring Department, and asked me whether I had made a transfer of 1200-plus roubles to a certain person (whom he named but whose name I don't recall). I naturally said no, because I don't make transfers to anybody other than my wife. Then he told me this meant that my account was compromised and invited me to undergo an ID verification procedure using the number of my Alfa Bank account contract or the number of my “plastic product”, ending in 5413, in order to install “two-factor protection” for my accounts.

What happened next and the outcome of it all, I described in my previous post on the subject.

To recap, I can say that the fraudsters succeeded in persuading me to wire funds to Gazprombank totalling RUR176,380 [$2500 at the exchange rate for that date].

As I have already reported, the swindlers asked me to keep mum for two days “while the police investigated”, but I called the bank and reported the fraud within ten minutes of hanging up with them, as well as emailing a transaction reversal request, as directed by the bankers, to the address given, contacting the police and reporting a crime. For its part, Alfa Bank took a whole week to respond to my SOS, advising me that it was misdirected (though I used the email address given in the text from the bank following my fraud report), but gave no alternative email address to sort out the issue.

It appears that fraudsters have been given an efficient and safe mechanism for fast and UNIMPEDED theft of bank deposits. Why did all Alfa Bank's anti-fraud measures fail? To be sure, it was I who made those transfers – and I do not deny this - but the system did not know that. My account history should have given it every reason to flag the transactions as suspicious. For a year and a half, I only made transfers using two templates: to my savings account with Alfa Bank in the amount of RUR10k once a month and to my wife's checking account with Alfa Bank now and again, each usually 20k, as templated. Plus, naturally enough, I pay taxes on my professional income and my utility bills. In this case, however, my Alfa account was nearly emptied, with two funds transfers made, each exactly RUR88k, to two different payees – and it all took place in the space of few minutes. OK, I accept that the first transfer could have sneaked under the radar, but how could the second?

To be sure, I made the transfers myself, and I'm willing to accept some of the responsibility, but not all of it, not by a long shot. I did not make the transfers “voluntarily”, e.g., because I wanted to help “a child in need of treatment” or “a cash-strapped friend”, but in an attempt to save my money from the clutches of alleged fraudsters, unable to think of other avenues of escape, being under extreme stress as I was in that situation. I would also just as “voluntarily” surrender all my money if a gun was put to my head and I was given a choice: “Your wallet or your life”. So what if it later turned out, for example, that the gun was not loaded, the safety was on or it was but a replica (which an expert wouldn't have missed), and there never was any real threat to my life? How does this change the situation for me as a victim who didn't know that?

When we deposit our money with a bank, we think we entrust it to professionals who will keep it safe, but it turns out not to be the case: making sure our money is safe in the bank is apparently part of our job description as depositors.

I find this unfair and wrote about it to the RF CB and RF President.

To be continued #AlfaBankFraud.